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Abstract 
Over the past 50 years, an increasing amount of political authority has been 
delegated to the regional government level in Europe. This paper analyses regional 
demands for involvement in policy-making by focusing on the preferences of top-
level regional civil servants (“regio-crats”). A survey (n=347) of regio-crats in 60 
regions of 5 European Union member states serves as the empirical basis for the 
analysis of regional demands for policy involvement in the multilevel system. The 
data reveal differential patterns of demands. By and large, regio-crats emerge as 
being conservative, incremental and modest in their wishes for greater policy 
involvement, except where the regional contexts are characterised by substantial 
emancipatory political ambitions or cultural distinctiveness. Regional demands for 
policy participation in the multilevel system are pragmatic, patch-worked and 
incremental, and more conservative than transformative. 
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Introduction 
Over the past 50 years, regions – and especially those in today’s European Union 
– have been entrusted with ever greater political authority (Hooghe et al. 2010). 
However, notwithstanding the growing political importance of regions, we know 
very little about the elites who run these subnational political structures, who shape 
regional political decisions and implement political programmes. The aim of this 
paper is twofold. First, we want to help fill this research gap by focussing on the 
preferences of top-level regional civil servants (“regio-crats”). Second, we put 
centre stage the question of the role of regions in the European multilevel 
governance context. In particular, two questions are raised: What explains regio-
crats’ preferences regarding involvement in policy-making (by their respective 
regions) in the multilevel system and, do we need regional-level variables in order 
to conduct a satisfying analysis of subnational preferences regarding vertical 
competence allocation? 
The questions we raise are of interest to those who study regions as agents of 
ongoing transformation of states and the rise of multilevel political orders, in 
general, and also to those investigating the regions of the European Union, in 
particular. We look for patterns in the regio-crats’ preference variations and 
suggest explanations for them. In order to answer our research questions, we 
conducted a survey among top-level subnational officials in five European 
countries and asked them about their preferences with respect to competence for 
their regions in twelve policy areas.  
Our quest for explanations is based on a view on socio-economic, political and 
cultural aspects of regional authorities. We believe that there is a link between the 
beliefs and attitudes of regio-crats (especially those at the top of their 
organisations) and the political structures for which they work. The individual – 
within certain range – can choose his actions and does so strategically with view of 
his self-interests. But he is also shaped by and thus embodies the way his 
organisation interprets outside reality.1 Moreover, by working in an institution an 
individual himself becomes the bearer of the norms, scripts and standard 
assessments of the collectivity he represents (Egeberg 2004).2 Under this 
assumption, we argue that the preferences of regio-crats represent a general 
estimate of subnational political ambitions to participate in the European multilevel 
governance system. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present competing approaches 
(individual, functional, national and regional) for how best to explain regio-crats’ 
preferences regarding policy competence allocation in multilevel constellations. 
Section 3 describes the survey we conducted and outlines the operationalisation of 
the explanatory approaches. The statistical analysis follows in Section 4, while 
Section 5 presents the conclusions drawn on the basis of our findings. As the 
analysis will show, we find a number of regional variables that are persistently 
significant across several different models. In particular, the variables concerning 
the cultural distinctiveness, institutional endowment and socioeconomic 
performance of regions stand out. In addition, the analysis shows that the personal 
opportunities of regio-crats influence their preferences regarding greater policy 
competence at the regional level. 
                                                                                                         
1 The use of male pronouns throughout the text is for ease of reading only and should be taken to refer 
to either gender. 
2 Institutionalists argue that “members of an institution observe and are the guardians of its constitutive 
principles and standards” and that their behaviour is based on a “logic of appropriateness and a sense 
of obligations and rights derived from an identity, role, or membership in a political community and the 
ethos and practices of its institutions” (Olsen 2009: 9). 
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Underlying Assumptions 
Before we elaborate on our theoretical models and begin the descriptive and 
analytical analyses, a word about the subnational data on which they are based 
seems in order. It is extremely difficult to acquire this kind of data, especially if it is 
to be suitable for cross-national comparisons. Usually, the researchers who are 
interested in subnational issues will have to obtain it themselves, which, in fact, 
was also the case for this study (details below). More concretely, our dependent 
variables are based on data illustrating the attitudes of regio-crats. Attitudinal data 
relating to elites in general have both strengths and weaknesses, and so do our 
subnational elite data. That is, individuals who work in the upper echelons of 
subnational authorities and have direct links to the political sphere probably form 
their preferences under different conditions than does the broader, generally less 
well-informed and less well-trained national public. One can thus assume that 
regio-crats, with their particular expertise and their routine familiarity with the 
regional political universe, hold views which (especially with respect to core topics 
related to their respective political entities) are different, more reliable and more 
coherent than those of the general public in their regions.  
Our research question is the following: What explains regio-crats’ attitudes 
concerning competence allocation in the multilevel system? In other words, what 
are the factors, with respect to a range of predefined policy areas, that lead regio-
crats to desire codetermination rights? The standard explanatory factors found in 
the literature are based on the concepts of individual utility, contextual variables 
and functionality (Hooghe 2001; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2008). We test these 
standard programmes, focusing, in particular, on the regional context. Factors that 
reflect the regional context are summarised under an explanatory programme 
based on regional social identity. We want to see whether and under which 
conditions such regional factors have an added value in their own right in 
explaining differences in preferences regarding regional participation in the 
European multilevel governance system (Pitschel 2012). We now turn to these 
explanatory programmes. 
The Individual Opportunity Approach 
The first explanatory programme is strongly related to the utility calculus. It argues 
that individuals calculate the respective impacts of different options on their 
personal opportunity structures. As a consequence, when faced with a choice, 
individuals will favour the option they believe will lead to a higher personal pay-off 
(Thielemann 2004: 367). Other studies have shown that individual opportunity 
structures – especially in the case of bureaucrats – are driving forces behind 
preference formation (Niskanen 1971; Dunleavy 1985; Searing 1991, 
1994).Regarding the question of regional authorities’ policy competences, we 
argue that top-level subnational bureaucrats will desire the allocation of 
competences to the regional level if they expect some gain for themselves.  
It is difficult to define the actual utility that might be involved. On the one hand, 
rational-choice research refers exclusively to tangible goods that are directly 
available to the individual (Kato 1996). Accordingly, financial incentives should be 
the driving force behind preference formations (Hooghe 2001). On the other hand, 
public-administration research often uses a broader conceptualisation of an 
individual’s utility. In this context, the commodity to be maximised does not refer 
exclusively to the individual but also to his social context (Levi 1997). In other 
words, tangible as well as non-financial goods – such as the prestige or power of a 
region – might play a role in the formation of subnational administrators’ 
preferences.  
European Journal of Government and Economics 1(1) 
 
12
 Applying such a broad concept of utility would obviously be problematic, because 
all manner of motives and factors that somehow relate to a utility consideration 
could be included.3 We thus follow the narrow conceptualisation of utility and 
consider only those aspects that are directly related to the amendment of the 
subnational administrators’ positions. Research on the motivations of public-
administration personnel has demonstrated that administrative elites are basically 
motivated in their career prospects and their opportunities for advancement 
(Searing 1994: 19; Hooghe 2001: 21). Regio-crats compete for leverage in 
designing policies. The more competences the regional level of authority has, the 
higher this leverage. In sum, the opportunity approach argues that regio-crats will 
desire more regional policy competences whenever they perceive that this would 
enhance their individual situations.  
The Functionality Approach 
The second explanatory programme concerns the nature of policies themselves. 
Recent studies find that functionality is an influential factor when the allocation of 
competences is examined (Schakel 2009). Similarly, Hooghe’s study (2003) on 
top-level officials in the European Commission and in national administrations 
demonstrates that political elites are guided by functional considerations when they 
are asked which policies should be regulated at the supranational and which at the 
national level. The issue of functionally efficient policy allocation is debated in the 
literature on fiscal federalism.4 Oates’ theorem states that, in the absence of 
problems of redistribution and negative external effects, policies should be 
allocated at the lowest possible hierarchy level (Oates 1999: 1122). In addition, 
although economies of scale might push the provision of most public goods and 
services towards the national (or even higher) political levels, possible 
heterogeneity of local preferences, which would pull allocation of competences to 
subnational levels, also has to be considered. Especially because detailed 
information about local diversity (which would be needed to design efficient policy 
solutions) is difficult to obtain and to process centrally, efficient (i.e., functional) 
allocation of competences is usually not quite as central as the functionality 
paradigm might seem to predict at first sight (Hooghe and Marks 2005). 
Concerning regio-crats, we can assume that they come with special knowledge 
about these characteristics of the different policies. In consequence, it is plausible 
to argue that they are able to roughly rate the efficiency of different options 
regarding policy competence allocation. In sum, if top-level subnational 
bureaucrats base their preferences regarding policy competences for regions on a 
rationale of functionality, then they should favour policy competences for 
subnational entities only if regulation at this level of authority is functionally 
efficient. 
The Subnational Social Identity Approach 
The explanatory programme we call the subnational social identity approach sees 
the affiliation of individuals to socially defined groups as an important factor in the 
formation of preferences (McLaren 2002; Diez Medrano 2003; Scully and Farrell 
2003; Thielemann 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005; van Esch 2006; de Vries and 
van Kersbergen 2007). Individuals form and orient their preferences in line with the 
norms and values of their own social groups. It is clear that subnational 
administrators are part of the socially defined group of the region to which they 
belong and for which they work. Since they hold top-level positions within their 
                                                                                                         
3 For a detailed discussion of this question, and for theoretical arguments, see Pitschel (2012). 
4 “The main analytical task for fiscal federalism has been to define the appropriate assignment of 
allocative responsibilities to decentralised government levels and matching revenue sources” (Bird et al. 
2002: 416). 
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regional administrations, they prepare, design and implement policies and political 
decisions and consequently are familiar with the political interests of their region. In 
consequence it is plausible to assume that the interests and preferences of 
regions’ institutions are a primary focus of the regional administrators.5 
According to the social identity approach, top-level bureaucrats should pursue the 
interests of their own regions and internalise regional preferences concerning 
political issues. Before we can analyse the desire for subnational policy 
competences, we first need information about regional ambitions regarding these 
competences. We can draw on the literature on subnational mobilisation that 
discusses policy-making processes (Hooghe 1995; Jeffery 1996, 2000; Tatham 
2008) to find explanatory factors for the emancipatory efforts of regions. Because 
the endowment of regions with policy competences reflects one aspect of 
emancipatory aspirations, we can use these same factors in order to determine 
subnational preferences. Generally, we argue that regions seeking to enhance 
their political profile will want to expand their political competences.  
One important factor discussed in the subnational mobilisation literature is the 
socioeconomic situation of regions (Bookman 1992; Harvie 1994; Marks et al. 
1996). However, there is disagreement about the actual direction of this 
relationship. On the one hand, socioeconomically strong regions want to gain some 
independence from central government and assume competence for certain 
policies (Gourevitch 1979). On the other hand, socioeconomically weak regions are 
also believed to have an incentive to take matters into their own hands with a view 
to advancing their economic development independently of the nation state 
(Hechter 1975; Fearon and van Houten 2002).  
Another factor that influences the emancipatory potential of a region is its cultural 
distinctiveness. Subnational authorities that deviate from the national population 
with respect to ethnic or religious characteristics are culturally distinct from the 
nation state. This regional identity induces the desire to safeguard self-
determination (Esman 1977; Connor 1994; Keating 1998; Alesina and Spolaore 
2003; Björklund 2006; Brancati 2006). Therefore, subnational entities that are 
culturally distinct from the nation state should be interested in holding competence 
with respect to many policies. Third, party-political competition is believed to 
influence subnational demands for autonomy (van Houten 2003, 2009). In 
particular, an incongruence in the composition of the governmental coalition 
between the regional and national levels might produce disagreement in policy-
making and consequently stimulate the desire for policy competences among 
regional elites.  
Finally, the institutional setting of subnational authorities – also discussed in the 
mobilisation literature – also has to be taken into account. On the one hand, 
regions that are already institutionally well endowed are argued to be more active 
promoters of policies. The less restricted subnational authorities are with respect to 
their policy engagement, the greater their (potential) scope for development. On 
the other hand, the status quo of regional competences should be a good predictor 
of desire for competence allocation because the current setting to some extent 
determines the possibility of increased allocation. In other words, the degree of 
constitutionally defined regional autonomy should be correlated with the amount of 
policy competence desired by regio-crats. 
                                                                                                         
5 We take some comfort from the findings of the CANS project (Citizenships After the Nation State). The 
team around Charlie Jeffery, Ailsa Henderson and Roland Sturm find in their regional population suvey 
broad support for regional authority. See http://www.institute-of-
governance.org/major_projects/citizen_after_the_nation_state citizens’ and Oberhofer et al. 2011. 
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To sum up, the social identity approach assumes that regio-crats’ preferences are 
influenced by specific characteristics of the regions they work for. In short, the 
greater the emancipatory potential of a region, the more competences for their 
region the elites should favour. Table 1 summarises our three candidate 
explanatory programs. 
Table 1: Explanatory approaches and respective hypotheses 
Explanatory 
approach Hypothesis Dependent variable 
Individual 
opportunity 
Regio-crats should desire more regional policy 
competences if they expect a positive impact on their 
individual situation. 
Functional 
criteria 
Regio-crats should favour policy competences for the 
regions if regulation at this level of authority is 
functionally efficient. 
Subnational 
social identity 
Regio-crats should desire more regional policy 
competences if they belong to a region with a high 
emancipatory potential. 
Regio-crats’ preferences 
regarding regional policy 
competences 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Research Design 
In order to test for the territorial effect on regio-crats’ preferences regarding policy 
allocation, we make use of a survey addressed to subnational administrative elites 
concerning their attitudes about different aspects of European integration and 
governance. We defined the subnational units we are interested in as political 
authorities which are located directly below the national level and have an elected 
assembly.6 The selection of interviewees – high-ranking officials in subnational 
administrations – was carried out in several stages.  
First, we had to decide which European member states should be included in the 
survey. Our aim was to ensure that the sample would feature interviewees from 
states with different institutional settings (decentralised and federal states). We 
also wanted to include entities with differences in their experience with the 
European integration process. We assumed that the older member states would 
have already consolidated their governance structures in the context of European 
integration. Thus, we decided to interview regio-crats in Germany, Spain, France, 
Poland, and Hungary comprehending old and new member states as well as 
decentralised and federal states. 
Second, the selection of the subnational units was guided by the consideration of 
including interviewees with distinct regional backgrounds. In order to increase the 
variety at the regional level and to ensure that we have variance on the explanatory 
variables, three factors were of major importance: the socioeconomic status of the 
interviewees’ respective regions, and their cultural and party-political incongruence 
with respect to the centre (the nation state). Such aspects had been theoretically 
conceived as potential explanatory factors. Hence, we ensured that both 
socioeconomically poor and rich regions, regions with and without cultural 
specificities, and regions with the same and with different governing parties 
compared to the party-political constellation at the centre were all represented 
(Marks et al. 1996; Keating 2008).7  
Third, the final criterion for the selection of the individuals was their position within 
the subnational administration. We focussed exclusively on heads of unit with 
policy responsibilities (cf. Bauer 2008) because these are assumed to be the 
                                                                                                         
6 This definition is similar to that of Marks et al. (1996).  
7 For a full list of the subnational authorities included in the survey, see Table 7 in the Appendix. The 
numbers of enclosed regions differ by country as a consequence of the size of the regional 
administrative body.  
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“backbone” of the subnational administrations. High-ranking civil servants generally 
started their careers within their respective subnational administrations. They hold 
their positions for a long time and usually demonstrate a high degree of 
identification with the political unit for which they work. They are equally 
knowledgeable with respect to the technical requirements of a dossier and with the 
political constellation surrounding it (Bauer 2008).  
Out of the initial sample, we randomly selected the interviewees for each region in 
each member state. However, due to the varying size and the diverging 
responsibilities of the regions represented, the numbers of interviewees per region 
ranged from 1 to 13. Altogether, the sample consisted of 347 individuals in 60 
regions (see Table 2). We developed a standardised questionnaire of about 100 
(mostly closed) questions. Telephone interviews were conducted by specially 
trained native speakers in 2007 and 2008.8  
Table 2: Sample structure 
Country Regions included in sample 
Interviews per 
region 
Interviews per 
country Response rate 
Germany 13 Länder (of 16) 4-9 78 47% 
Poland 12 Voiwodships (of 16) 2-9 70 45% 
Hungary 19 Megyek (of 19) 2-7 84 41% 
France 10 Régions (of 26) 1-13 66 45% 
Spain 6 Autonomous Communities (of 17) 5-11 49 53% 
Total   347  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Our dependent variable is the regio-crats’ preferences regarding the participation 
of the subnational level in twelve policy areas in the European multilevel system.9 
We thus asked top-level subnational bureaucrats to decide whether or not regional 
authorities should be involved in policy-making across a range of twelve specific 
policy areas.10 We constructed an additive index ranging from 0 (no regional 
competence) to 12 (competence regarding all policies under study). An even more 
detailed analysis is possible if we distinguish between policies which are regulated 
in a functionally efficient manner at the regional level and those which are not. 
However, we need an objective benchmark in order to evaluate whether or not a 
particular policy is regulated efficiently at the subnational level. Such a benchmark 
does not exist, however, or where researchers have developed something of this 
nature, it is unsuitable for application to the policy categories we chose for our 
study.11 We adopt a second-best solution for our problem by following fiscal 
federalism arguments and then deducing implications for the subnational level. In 
essence, we assess whether the scope and externalities of policies are decisive 
parameters for ascertaining whether a certain policy can be regulated efficiently at 
the regional level or not. We derive a yardstick which is explained in more detail in 
                                                                                                         
8 For a sociological overview of this data set of administrative elites and for further information, see 
Bauer et al. (2010). 
9 Multilevel governance is a complex concept comprising aspects that concern policy competences and 
also varying modes of coordination and interaction (Benz 2007; Benz and Zimmer 2008; Tömmel 2008). 
In our project, we limited our analysis exclusively to aspects concerning policy competence allocation. 
10 The twelve policy areas are social affairs, asylum and immigration, foreign affairs and defence, health 
care and consumer protection, border police and frontier defence, culture and education, agriculture, 
tourism, environmental protection, monetary policy, economic development and structural policy, and 
research and technology. Note that we do not differentiate between administrative and legislative 
competences. 
11 Schakel (2009) conducted an expert survey in order to obtain information which authoritative level 
efficiently regulates in regard to certain policies. However, the categorisation carried out in his study is 
not applicable in our context as we have different and broader policies under study. 
European Journal of Government and Economics 1(1) 
 
16
the Appendix.12 Based on this distinction, we can derive two other variations of the 
dependent variable. One concerns the preference for competence allocation at the 
regional level in regard to policies which are efficiently regulated by subnational 
authorities, while the other concerns those which are not. 
The operationalisation of the opportunity approach is based on individual-level 
variables which were also collected by means of the survey.13 On the one hand, 
the dummy variable “career ambitions” indicates whether top-level bureaucrats 
want to advance their career within the regional administration where they work.14 
The dummy variable “security of employment” (as a motivation for entering the 
subnational administration) taps into another common aspect of individual utility. 
The subnational social identity programme is based on factors that are common in 
subnational mobilisation research. The variable “regional gdp” (Gross Domestic 
Product) describes the socioeconomic situation of the regions. The dummy 
variable “stateless nation” indicates cultural differences between the nation state 
and the subnational entities. The party-political situation is captured by the 
opposition variables: if the subnational governmental coalition is partly in 
opposition at the national level, the variable “partly in opposition” is coded 1 
(otherwise 0). If no regional government party is represented in the national 
government, the variable “completely in opposition” takes the value 1.15 Finally, the 
institutional embeddedness of the subnational authorities is operationalised by an 
indicator taken from the regional authority index developed by Hooghe et al. 
(2010). The variable “institutional depth” measures the extent to which a regional 
government is autonomous as opposed to deconcentrated.16  
Finally, we include a control variable allocated at the subnational measurement 
level. The variable “regional population (log)” captures how populous a subnational 
entity is. In the literature, it is assumed that efficient provision of public goods is 
determined not only by the characteristics of the policies themselves, but also by 
the size of the affected group. We argue that, all else being equal, the larger the 
regional population, the more efficient (or less inefficient) is the regulation of the 
policy at the subnational level. Because regions differ in regard to their number of 
inhabitants, we control for this fact. Our list of policies for which subnational 
administrators can articulate their preferences for codetermination is both rather 
broad and quite general – for instance, “culture and education” instead of more 
fine-grained policies, such as “primary schools”. This enables us to assume that 
the handling of our policy categories at the regional level will be more efficient (i.e., 
more functional) the greater the size of the subnational population. Although this 
factor picks up on the functionality argument, for methodological reasons we 
cannot integrate a variable representing the actual functional reasoning of our 
                                                                                                         
12 Table 9 in the Appendix provides an overview of the classification of the policies. We argue that 
policies that are generally characterised by high externalities should be regulated at a higher level. In 
other words, we believe that in such cases the participation of regional authorities is less functional. This 
approach might be criticised as a normative and subjective decision. However, in consideration of the 
fact that we need an objective benchmark which is applicable to our framework, this, in our view, is the 
most objective and transparent approach possible. Due to problems of endogeneity, we could not justify 
validating the classification exclusively on the basis of the preferences of the interviewees. 
13 For an overview of the independent variables, the operationalisation, the coding and sources, and the 
expected sign of the coefficient, see Table 8 in the Appendix. 
14 Table 2 provides an overview of the operationalisation of the variables. 
15 The situation where a regional government coalition is completely represented in the central 
government is the reference group in the quantitative analysis. The aspect of incongruence respectively 
congruence between the governing coalition at regional and national levels is a categorical variable. 
Therefore we decided to split the potential situations in three dummy variables. 
16 The variable has a theoretical value range of 0 to 4. In our data set, “institutional depth” takes on the 
values of 3 and 4. 
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interviewees in the statistical analyses below.17 However, we do address the 
functionality approach by means of a descriptive analysis in the next section. To 
test whether the factors characterising the different approaches explain the regio-
crats’ preferences for policy allocation at the regional level, we use a multilevel 
analysis with random-effects. The individuals constitute the first and the regions the 
second level of the model.18  
Table 3: Operationalisation of the explanatory variables 
Explanatory 
approach Variable Operationalisation 
Expected 
sign 
career ambitions Interviewee wants to advance his career within the subnational administration.19 + Individual 
Opportunity security of employment 
Interviewee is motivated by the security of 
employment within the subnational 
administration.20 
+ 
Functionality  
Number of individual competence 
preferences that match with allocation as 
functionally efficient for the twelve policies 
under study. 
+ 
regional gdp Gross Domestic Product -/ + 
stateless nation The region is a stateless nation. + 
partly in opposition 
Regional governmental coalition is partly 
congruent with the national governmental 
coalition  
+ 
completely in opposition Regional governmental coalition is in opposition at national level. + 
Subnational 
Social Identity  
institutional depth Extent to which a subnational government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated. + 
Control regional population (log) The logarithm of the regional population. + 
Source: Authors’ compilation. Note: For an explanation as to why we do not operationalise the 
functionality approach, please see footnote 12.  
Empirical Analyses 
Asked whether the subnational level should hold competence regarding twelve 
policy areas, the average response of regio-crats was in the mid-range, although 
there was a high standard deviation (see Table 4). In general, the regio-crats we 
surveyed turned out to be surprisingly reluctant to see regions participating in the 
multilevel governance system. A comparison of the national mean values for 
competence allocation at the regional level reveals variation in the preferences for 
subnational participation within our sample. First, we observe differences across 
countries. Hungarian top-level subnational bureaucrats do not see a need for 
                                                                                                         
17 In our descriptive analysis, we assess with respect to how many policies the individuals’ preferences 
are in line with functionally efficient policy allocation. However, if we included such an independent 
variable in the regression analysis, we would explain the dependent variable by means of a part of a 
modified dependent variable. 
18 A potential objection to this research strategy might be the choice of the statistical model. We do not 
use dummy variables for the countries in order to control for country-specific factors, rather we 
emphasise the individual and the regional levels. Given that we integrate several (potential) explanatory 
factors measured at the subnational level, we risk falling into the trap of multicollinearity. We also use an 
indicator capturing the institutional setting in the nation states. 
19 The variable is based on a survey question: ”Which professional position would you like to have 
reached in 5-10 years? That is, other or same position in the regional administration in a national 
ministry, in the EU administration?” Whenever the interviewee indicated that he sought to reach a higher 
position in the administration, the variable “career ambitions” is coded “1” otherwise “0”. 
20 The information is based on a survey question: “Why do you have chosen to work in the 
administration of a region? Please tell me the most important reason.” The answer options had been 
secure job, proximity to residence, good salary, good career prospects, interesting working area, would 
like to contribute to the development of the region, I was offered this job, or decentralization or fusion. 
For interviewees indicated the option “secure job” the variable “security of employment” is codes “1” 
otherwise “0”. 
European Journal of Government and Economics 1(1) 
 
18
extensive policy participation. On average, they desire competence regarding only 
1.6 of the twelve policy areas. Although the desire for policy competence is 
stronger in the other countries, German respondents are still surprisingly modest in 
their preferences, desiring subnational competence for only 3.4 policies. This 
picture is noteworthy because the preferences actually lag behind the status quo 
for German Länder competences. The national mean values for the Polish (4.8) 
and French (4.3) respondents point to a mid-degree claim for codetermination 
rights compared to the other country scores. In contrast, Spanish top-level 
subnational bureaucrats favour regional participation in about eight policy areas, 
which reflects a desire for strong policy participation within the European multilevel 
system.21 Second, the standard deviations for the countries listed in Table 4 
indicate considerable within-country variation as well. In other words, we do find 
interesting variation within the five countries. What explains such differences 
among regio-crats’ preferences for policy codetermination rights? 
Table 4: National mean values for desired policy competence22 
Country Mean SD N 
Germany 3.4 2.3 76 
Poland 4.8 2.5 65 
Hungary 1.6 1.8 83 
France 4.3 2.0 65 
Spain 8.0 1.3 49 
Total 4.1 2.8 338 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
Can the differential desires for policy codetermination be explained by 
functionality? Looking at the preference patterns of the top-level subnational 
bureaucrats in regard to the twelve policy areas, we are able to assess whether the 
administrators form their preferences on the basis of a functionality rationale or not. 
By comparing the preference patterns for regional policy competences to what we 
deem would be the objective functional policy allocation, we are able to assess 
whether or not there is a correlation. If the interviewees favoured regional policy 
participation regardless of whether or not such codetermination is functional 
(according to our assessment), we have at least an indication that some other than 
a functional-efficiency explanation must be at work. 
Having carried out the categorisation, we can count for how many policies the 
answers of our regio-crats are in line with the presumably most efficient allocation. 
Our result is that the answers of our respondents are substantially in line with 
functional criteria of competence allocation. Table 5 gives an overview of the share 
of policies for which the regio-crats’ preferences for regional participation (or non-
participation) are in accordance with the allocation on the basis of functional 
efficiency. For example, the preferences of about 59 percent of the German 
interviewees are in line with the functionality rationale for six to eight policies. In 
France, about 57 percent of our respondents show preferences that correspond 
with the efficient participation or non-participation of regional authorities for more 
than eight policies. All in all, in every country we studied, the preferences regarding 
(non-)participation of subnational authorities of the majority of interviewees 
correspond with the functional-efficiency expectation. Only a few respondents 
demonstrate codetermination preferences that clearly conflict with functionality. 
                                                                                                         
21 For a detailed discussion of the preferences regarding policy competences, see Pitschel (2012). 
22 The table shows the mean value of the desired number of policies for regional policy competences. 
Shown are the mean values (mean) of the preferences, the standard deviation (sd), and the number of 
respondents (N) for the sample and per country. 
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Table 5: Correspondence of regio-crats’ preferences with functional needs23 
For how many of the twelve policies do subnational administrators’ responses correspond with efficient 
competence allocation?  
 
 Germany Poland Hungary France Spain Total 
For less 
than 6 
policies 
7.9 9.2 41.0 4.6 12.2 16.3 
For 6 to 8 
policies 59.2 41.5 50.6 38.5 83.7 53.3 
For more 
than 8 
policies 
32.9 49.2 8.4 56.9 4.1 30.4 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
Summing up, we observe that the national mean preferences for regional 
participation in the twelve policies differ across the five countries, with the Spanish 
having the highest and the Hungarian the lowest scores. At the same time, 
however, we observe variation within the countries under study. The individuals’ 
preferences concerning the desired extent of regional policy competence vary 
considerably within the countries. Individual attitudes deviate most around the 
respective national average in Poland and Germany. To find a reason for this 
result, we turn to the statistical analysis. 
Quantitative Analysis 
Our quantitative analysis assesses how the factors underlying the explanatory 
approaches are related to the dependent variable, namely the desire for regional 
codetermination in different policy areas. We basically run three regressions, which 
differ in the conceptualisation of the dependent variable. The dependent variable of 
the first model refers to all twelve policies under study. In the second and third 
models, the dependent variables relate to policies for which (according to our 
yardstick) regions constitute the functionally appropriate – or non-appropriate – 
governmental level of execution for the policies in our sample. This procedure 
enables us to detect stable relationships between the independent variables and 
the subnational administrators’ preferences regarding regional policy 
codetermination. Moreover, we gain knowledge about the influence of policy-
inherent logics on the process of preference formation. The results of the models 
are presented in Table 6. 
First, the subnational administrators’ preferences regarding regional competence 
are analysed with respect to all twelve policies (Model 1 in Table 6). Concerning 
the individual-utility variables, only the indicator for safety thinking (“security of 
employment”) is significant. The positive sign is in line with the theoretically 
expected relationship: Administrators who entered subnational administrations 
motivated by security of employment are in favour of more subnational 
competences. As regards the social identity approach, the socioeconomic variable 
reflecting the regions’ economic performance (measured in GDP) shows a 
negative sign – implying that the desire for subnational competence decreases with 
regional wealth. In other words, our data show that regio-crats from 
socioeconomically weaker regions are more in favour of regional policy 
participation than their colleagues from socioeconomically stronger entities. 
Cultural distinctiveness is also influential as a predictor of regional desire for 
emancipation from the nation state. The positive and significant coefficient of the 
                                                                                                         
23 Percentage of respondents per country for which the preferences for regional policy competences are 
in line with the functionality principle. Whether participation or non-participation of subnational 
authorities in policies is functionally efficient was evaluated on the basis of objective criteria (see Table 
9 in the Appendix). 
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variable “stateless nation” indicates that subnational administrators of such regions 
in our sample (Alsace and Brittany in France, Catalonia and País Vasco in Spain) 
want to have more subnational policy competences. We also find significant 
coefficients concerning the indicators of the party-political constellation. On the one 
hand, the subnational context in which the regional government is “partly in 
opposition” to the national government or government coalition seems to be 
negatively related to the desire of the top-level bureaucrats for regional policy 
competences. In contrast, the individuals from subnational authorities where the 
regional government is “completely in opposition” to the national government (or 
governmental coalition) are obviously more in favour of policy participation by their 
authority. We supposed that the institutional setting would influence the 
preferences as well. The significant and positive coefficient of the variable 
“institutional depth” is in line with the theoretical expectation that top-level 
bureaucrats from institutionally strong regions would desire more codetermination 
rights over a greater range of policy areas. What also shows a significant and 
positive coefficient, however, is the variable measuring regional population. This 
means that the larger the regional population, the more competences are desired 
by regio-crats. The model including all twelve policies shows a considerably higher 
degree of variance between the groups (regions) than within the regions. Overall, 
Model 1 explains about 24 percent of the variance. 
Table 6: Regression results for all 12 policies 
Explanatory 
approach  Variables 
Model 1 
all 12 policies  
Model 2 
7 functional policies 
Model 3 
5 non-functional 
policies 
career ambitions 0.043 0.041 0.002 
 (0.279) (0.223) (0.090) 
security of 
employment 0.969* 0.381 0.386** 
Opportunity 
approach 
 (0.518) (0.413) (0.168) 
regional gdp -0.125** -0.069* -0.058** 
 (0.053) (0.037) (0.024) 
stateless nation 2.728*** 1.548*** 1.229*** 
 (0.833) (0.587) (0.373) 
partly in opposition -1.427*** -1.275*** -0.112 
 (0.449) (0.313) (0.204) 
completely in 
opposition 1.410* 0.807 0.646* 
 (0.773) (0.537) (0.352) 
institutional depth 1.521** 0.298 1.244*** 
Subnational 
social 
identity 
 (0.678) (0.473) (0.308) 
regional population 
(log) 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 Control 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 constant 2.086* 3.568*** -1.521*** 
  (1.255) (0.877) (0.567) 
 observations 297 297 296 
 number of regions 57 57 57 
 r-squared within 0.000 0.000 0.003 
  between 0.446 0.446 0.362 
  overall 0.243 0.182 0.315 
Source: Authors’ compilation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Second, we analysed only those policies that can be deemed efficiently regulated 
at the subnational level (Model 2 in Table 6).24 Whereas the individual variables of 
the opportunity model seem not to be influential at all, the social identity variables 
show similar patterns to the first model. The “regional gdp” variable is once again 
negative and significant. Similarly, the “stateless nation” variable is significant and 
                                                                                                         
24 These policies are social affairs, health care and consumer protection, culture and education, tourism, 
environmental protection, research and technology, and economic development and structural policy. 
The reasons for this classification are explained in Table 9 in the Appendix. 
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has a positive sign, as in the preceding model. With respect to the party-political 
situation, only the variable “partly in opposition” maintains its negative and 
significant coefficient in this model. In contrast, the variable “completely in 
opposition” is insignificant in Model 2. The same is true for the regional authority 
variable “institutional depth”. Neither “fiscal autonomy” nor “regional representation” 
show a significant coefficient. Finally, the regional population size repeatedly 
demonstrates a positive and significant coefficient. Comparing the variance 
explained by this model to the first model, we do not find any enhancement, neither 
in the explanation of the individual-level variance nor in the explanation of the 
between variance. However, the overall explained variance of the model on those 
policies that are efficiently regulated at the regional level is lower than in the model 
including all twelve policies (Model 1). 
Finally, we assess the explanatory programmes with respect to those policies in 
our sample that are supposedly not efficiently regulated at the regional level (see 
Model 3 in Table 6).25 This variant of the dependent variable might be an 
interesting case for both the opportunity and the subnational identity approaches. 
Do such variables influence the preference for regional policy competence 
although such participation is not efficient? In this third model, the individual 
variable of the opportunity explanatory program “career ambition” again shows no 
significant and positive coefficient. In contrast, the variable “security of 
employment” regains its theoretically expected positive sign.  
The subnational identity approach variables perform comparably to the second 
model. The “regional gdp” variable shows a negative and significant coefficient. 
The better the socioeconomic situation concerning GDP, the less policy 
competences are desired by regio-crats. The variable indicating that a region 
represents a stateless nation is positive and significant, as expected. The same 
holds for the political variable “completely in opposition”, which reflects the situation 
where the regional governmental coalition is incongruent with the party-political 
constellation in national government. Again, we see our expectation of a positive 
relationship between this variable and the desire for more regional competences 
confirmed. The variable “partly in opposition”, however, is not significant. 
Concerning the aspect of regional autonomy, we find that subnational 
administrators from regions which are institutionally well endowed favour more 
policy competences.  
The variance between the units explained by the regression model is lower than in 
the other two models. Model 3 explains about 36 percent of the variance between 
the regions. Compared to Model 1 and 2 this proportion is lower. In contrast, with 
regard to the overall variance, we find a high proportion is explained by Model 3 
(about 32 percent).  
Discussing the regression results in the context of non-functional policies, we 
believe this is evidence that subnational administrators’ preference formation is 
based on an opportunity rationale. Personal interest in secure employment in the 
regional administration is influential not only in the first model, comprising all twelve 
policies, but also in third model, which concentrates on those policies that are not 
efficiently regulated at the regional level. As regards the emancipatory ambitions of 
regional authorities, which are supposed to be the driving force in the social identity 
approach, we find some evidence to confirm the theoretical reasoning. Whereas 
the picture is clear for those administrators from culturally distinct regions who 
favour more policy competences, the influence of the political situation is less 
evident. In contrast, we find unambiguous results for the influence of the 
                                                                                                         
25 These policies are asylum and immigration, foreign affairs and defence, border police and frontier 
defence, agriculture, and monetary policy. The reasons for this classification are explained in Table 9 in 
the Appendix. 
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institutional setting (“institutional depth”) on the extent of regional policy 
participation. 
Summing up, the results of our quantitative analysis are consistent. The significant 
variables do not change their signs in the different models and we find the 
theoretical expectations generally confirmed. However, some points have to be 
reinvestigated in more detail. This applies, in particular, to the influence of the 
party-political constellation of the regions compared to the situation at the central 
state level. On the one hand, we find the expected relationship for the case when 
the regional government is not congruent with the party-political constellation of the 
central government. On the other hand, the opposite is true for the case where the 
regional government is partly in opposition at the national level. This contradicts 
the theoretical expectation and requires further investigation.  
Conclusion 
Two sets of conclusions can be drawn from this study. The first concerns the 
insights our analysis is able to generate in view of the question as to how to explain 
regio-crats’ preferences regarding policy participation in the multilevel system. 
Notwithstanding bold statements in the relevant literature, the desire for 
subnational policy codetermination is astonishingly low throughout our sample. 
Regio-crats cannot be seen as “competence conquerors” that fuel state 
transformation by demanding ever greater policy involvement. Quite the contrary, 
regio-crats appear in this respect to be rather conservative. There is little reason to 
fear (or hope, depending on the perspective) that regions will shake up the existing 
competence distribution; the suspicion that regions will actively ask for ever greater 
policy involvement cannot be substantiated by our data. Instead, the preferences 
seem to a large extent based on a rationale of functionality. The big picture is that 
regio-crats’ policy participation demands are in harmony with what can be 
conceived as objectively efficient vertical competence allocation.  
On a smaller scale, however, the statistical analyses show that besides individual 
utility aspects, variables that are related to regional emancipatory ambitions also 
have a positive influence on the desire for more policy competence. Cultural and 
political distinctiveness (in comparison to the situation at the central state level) 
increase the demand for regional policy involvement. In other words, a large-scale 
and uniform transformation in the direction of a Europe of the regions is unlikely. 
Pressure for greater regional policy involvement is differential and its direction and 
magnitude depend on particular regional situations. On the basis of our analysis, 
we do not expect demands for regional policy involvement to be systemic and 
systematic, but disorderly, disparate and diverse. Regional policy participation 
demands in the multilevel system are pragmatic, patch-worked and incremental – 
and more conservative than transformative.  
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Appendix 
Table 7: Overview of regions represented in the sample 
Country Region Number of Interviewees  Country Region 
Number of 
Interviewees 
Dolnośląskie 7  Alpes Côte 7 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 9  Alsace 4 
Lubelskie 7  Aquitaine 1 
Lubuskie 6  Bretagne 6 
Małopolskie 5  Centre 13 
Mazowieckie 4  Franche-Comté 4 
Opolskie 8  Île-de-France 8 
Podkarpackie 4  Midi-Pyrénées 10 
Pomorskie 6  Poitou-Charentes 6 
Śląskie 2  
France 
Rhône-Alpes 7 
Świętokrzyskie 5     
Poland 
Wielkopolskie 7     
       
Bács-Kiskun 5  Baden-Württemberg 8 
Baranya 3  Bayern 8 
Békés 3  Berlin 4 
Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplén 7  Brandenburg 5 
Csongrád 4  Hessen 5 
Fejér 4  Niedersachsen 5 
Győr-Moson-Sopron 6  Nordrhein-Westfalen 9 
Hajdú-Bihar 4  Rheinland-Pfalz 7 
Heves 7  Saarland 5 
Jász-Nagyun-
Szolnok 3  Sachsen 6 
Komárom-
Esztergom 6  Sachsen-Anhalt 7 
Nógrád 3  Schleswig-Holstein 4 
Pest 7  
Germany 
Thüringen 5 
Somogy 6     
Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg 3  Andalucía 11 
Tolna 3  Baleares 9 
Vas 5  Cataluña 6 
Veszprém 3  Galicia 8 
Hungary 
Zala 2  Madrid 10 
    
Spain 
País Vasco 5 
Table 8: Independent variables 
Variable 
Level of 
measurem
ent 
Operationalisation Coding Expected sign 
career ambitions 
Interviewee wants to advance 
his career within the 
subnational administration. 
1 = yes, 0 = no + 
security of 
employment 
Individual Interviewee is motivated by 
the security of employment 
within the subnational 
administration. 
1 = yes, 0 = no + 
regional gdp 
Subnation
al Gross Domestic Product Gross Domestic 
Product (purchasing-
power parity) per 
-/ + 
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capita in 1000 Euro 
stateless nation The region is a stateless nation. 1 = yes, 0 = no + 
partly in 
opposition 
Regional governmental 
coalition is partly congruent 
with the national governmental 
coalition.  
1 = yes, 0 = no + 
completely in 
opposition 
Regional governmental 
coalition is in opposition at the 
national level. 
1 = yes, 0 = no + 
institutional depth 
Extent to which a subnational 
government is autonomous 
rather than deconcentrated. 
0 = no functioning 
general-purpose 
administration at the 
regional level;  
1= deconcentrated, 
general-purpose 
administration;  
2 = non-
deconcentrated, 
general–purpose 
administration 
subject to central 
government veto;  
3 = non-
deconcentrated, 
general–purpose 
administration not 
subject to central 
government veto. 
 
+ 
regional 
population (log) 
Regional population as 
percentage of the national 
population. 
log (percentage) + 
Table 9: Classification of policies 
Policy 
Is a regional 
participation in 
this policy 
functional? 
Rationale  
Social affairs yes 
The standard of regulation of social affairs is already high within the 
EU member states, so that there is no call for central regulation 
(Alesina et al., 2001). Furthermore, some studies argue that differing 
levels of regulation might lead to a competitive advantage for a 
region in some sociopolitical areas (and that heterogeneous 
preferences regarding regional regulation can be traced back to this) 
(cf. Hoeller et al. 1996; Smekal 2001). At any rate, the involvement 
of the regions is consistent with the functional principles of 
competence allocation.  
Asylum and 
immigration  no 
The area of asylum and immigration is characterised by high 
external effects. To internalise these and to avoid free-rider effects, 
regulation ought to be conducted as centrally as possible (i.e., at 
national or supranational level) (Alesina, et al., 2001; Shah, 2007). 
Foreign 
affairs and 
defence  
no  
This policy area is characterised by high external effects. Moreover, 
regulation preferences are relatively homogeneous (at least within 
the EU member states). By centralising (regulation at EU level), 
external effects can be more fairly distributed in the community, 
free-rider effects can be avoided and national obstacles overcome 
(Ter-Minassian 1997). Other authors claim that foreign and defence 
policies should be regulated at the national level because resulting 
costs and benefits also manifest at the national level (Shah 2002). 
According to this view, regional participation in foreign affairs and 
defence is not functional. 
Health and 
consumer 
protection 
yes  
Health care and consumer protection need to be adjusted to the 
citizens’ requirements on site, while, at the same time, standards 
should be uniform and binding EU wide. The most efficient approach 
is for health care and consumer protection to be regulated under 
involvement of all levels of the hierarchy (EU, nation state and 
subnational entities) (Alesina et al. 2001; Smekal 2001; Hooghe and 
Marks 2009). Thus, the regions should be involved in shaping this 
policy. 
Border police no This policy also entails high externalities, which – from a functional 
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and frontier 
defence 
perspective – need to be re-allocated to the community (Hoeller et 
al. 1996). From a European point of view, the observance of uniform 
standards and the export provisions of the Schengen Agreement 
must be kept in mind.  
Culture and 
education yes  
The policy area of culture and education has a strong identity-
defining component. Thus, heterogeneous regulation preferences 
potentially outweigh external effects. Resulting benefits of 
centralisation are estimated as limited. Hence, and in line with 
functional considerations, a decentralised provision of services is to 
be preferred here (Smekal 2001; Schakel 2010).  
Agriculture no 
In the EU context and under efficiency considerations, regulation at 
the community level is not justifiable. However, excessive 
decentralisation would counteract the Single Market (Alesina, et al. 
2001; Hoeller et al. 1996). Hence, from a functional perspective, this 
policy can be best organised at the national level. 
Tourism  yes  
Regional preferences and requirements vary within this policy. In 
addition, for many regions, tourism holds an identity-defining 
component. Accordingly, the regions should be involved in shaping 
this policy (Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
Environment  yes  
Due to the strong external effects of environmental problems and 
their transnational scope, a stipulation of regulation standards on the 
supranational level would fit best. However, specific environmental 
problems are regionally concentrated, so that an involvement of 
national and subnational entities in environmental politics is 
assumed to be functionally adequate (Alesina et al. 2001; Sinn 
2003). 
Monetary 
policy  no 
Monetary policy (at least in the EU) is among those policies that, for 
reasons of economic efficiency, should be regulated centrally. Even 
if states are not members of the European Monetary Union (Euro), a 
central regulation seems to be appropriate to guarantee uniform 
standards of quality (Alesina et al. 2001; Smekal 2001). 
Economic 
development 
and structural 
policy 
yes  
In the area of economic development and structural policy, it is 
assumed to be economically wise to regulate basic aspects and 
conditions at the central level (EU) to avoid distortions of 
competition. However, subnational actors should be involved during 
policy implementation so as to ensure an efficient realisation on site 
which corresponds to regional requirements (Alesina et al. 2001; 
Hoeller et al. 1996). 
Research and 
technology  yes  
Differing regional standards of regulation in the area of research and 
technology boost regional competition and are seen as regional 
economic factors. Accordingly, a decentralised regulation is to be 
preferred from a functional perspective. However, it is also argued 
that some research areas, e.g., nuclear energy, require a central 
political organisation (Alesina et al. 2001). 
